


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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(International Security Affairs)

# POLITICO-MILITARY GAME



## FINAL REPORT

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## OLYMPIAD I-62

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| Inside Front Cover (Courtesy - Milton Caniff)   |             |
| Table of Contents                               |             |
| Foreword. . . . .                               | 1           |
| Prologue (Game Staff Comments). . . . .         | 11          |
| <br><b>PRE-GAME:</b>                            |             |
| List of Participants. . . . .                   | 1           |
| General Information For Team Members. . . . .   | 3           |
| Game Organization and Procedures. . . . .       | 7           |
| Game Schedule . . . . .                         | 15          |
| General Scenarios:                              |             |
| Blue . . . . .                                  | 19          |
| Red. . . . .                                    | 31          |
| <br><b>GAMES:</b>                               |             |
| <b>EPSILON III (Berlin):</b>                    |             |
| Special Scenario (Blue). . . . .                | 41          |
| Special Scenario (Red) . . . . .                | 49          |
| Treaty (For Game Purposes Only). . . . .        | 59          |
| Questions and Answers (Blue & Red) . . . . .    | 69          |
| Initial Strategy (Blue). . . . .                | 73          |
| Initial Strategy (Red) . . . . .                | 77          |
| Seminar Presentation:                           |             |
| Strategy (Blue) . . . . .                       | 81          |
| Strategy (Red). . . . .                         | 83          |
| Scenario Projection (Control-Blue). . . . .     | 85          |
| Riposte (Blue). . . . .                         | 86          |
| Scenario Projection (Control-Red) . . . . .     | 87          |
| Riposte (Red) . . . . .                         | 88          |
| <br><b>MU III (Mid-East):</b>                   |             |
| Special Scenario (Blue). . . . .                | 89          |
| Special Scenario (Red) . . . . .                | 97          |
| Questions and Answers (Blue & Red) . . . . .    | 103         |
| Initial Strategy (Blue). . . . .                | 105         |
| Initial Strategy (Red) . . . . .                | 107         |
| Seminar Presentations:                          |             |
| Strategy (Blue) . . . . .                       | 111         |
| Strategy (Red). . . . .                         | 113         |
| Scenario Projection #1 (Control-Blue) . . . . . | 115         |

|   | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| Riposte #1 (Blue) . . . . .                     | 116         |
| Actions Not Used #1 (Blue) . . . . .            | 117         |
| Scenario Projection #1 (Control-Red) . . . . .  | 119         |
| Riposte #1 (Red) . . . . .                      | 120         |
| Actions Not Used #1 (Red) . . . . .             | 122         |
| Scenario Projection #2 (Control-Blue) . . . . . | 123         |
| Riposte #2 (Blue) . . . . .                     | 124         |
| Actions Not Used #2 (Blue) . . . . .            | 125         |
| Scenario Projection #2 (Control-Red) . . . . .  | 127         |
| Riposte #2 (Red) . . . . .                      | 128         |
| Actions Not Used #2 (Red) . . . . .             | 129         |

#### ZIP IV (Disarmament - Zonal Inspection):

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Special Scenario (Blue) . . . . .                              | 131 |
| Special Scenario (Red) . . . . .                               | 137 |
| Game Treaty . . . . .  | 147 |
| Game Assumptions . . . . .                                     | 153 |
| Questions and Answers (Blue & Red) . . . . .                   | 159 |
| Strategy (Blue) . . . . .                                      | 161 |
| Strategy (Red) . . . . .                                       | 165 |
| Non-Treaty Proposals (Blue-Red, Red-Blue) . . . . .            | 167 |
| Zonal Map (Blue) . . . . .                                     | 169 |
| Zonal Armament Declarations (Blue) . . . . .                   | 171 |
| Total Declarations of Red Team Zones<br>(To Blue) . . . . .    | 181 |
| Inspection Request (Blue To Control) . . . . .                 | 182 |
| IDO Inspection Report of Red Team Zones<br>(To Blue) . . . . . | 183 |
| Zonal Map (Red) . . . . .                                      | 187 |
| Zonal Armament Declarations (Red) . . . . .                    | 189 |
| Total Declarations of Blue Team Zones<br>(To Red) . . . . .    | 199 |
| Inspection Request (Red To Control) . . . . .                  | 200 |
| IDO Inspection Report of Blue Team Zones<br>(To Red) . . . . . | 201 |
| Scenario Projection (Control To Blue) . . . . .                | 207 |
| Scenario Projection (Control To Red) . . . . .                 | 211 |

#### DAFT (Decade After):

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Special Scenario, DAFT I - Team "X" . . . . .   | 213 |
| Special Scenario, DAFT II - Team "Y" . . . . .  | 219 |
| Special Scenario, DAFT III - Team "Z" . . . . . | 229 |
| Seminar Presentations:                          |     |
| Strategy, Team "X" . . . . .                    | 243 |
| Strategy, Team "Y" . . . . .                    | 252 |
| Strategy, Team "Z" . . . . .                    | 260 |

POST-GAME:

Page

CRITIQUE. . . . . 265

NOTE: Background data was furnished to the players to assist them in their deliberations. This data included Tension Timetables (15-20 year chronological listing of world events relative to the crisis area), Treaty and Agreement excerpts, Country Summaries, and Military Postures. This data is not considered germane to this report and therefore was omitted.

FOREWORD

This document contains the official record of the politico-military game, OLYMPIAD I-62.

The game was sponsored by the Department of Defense (International Security Affairs), prepared and conducted by the Joint War Games Control Group (JWGCG) and directed by Colonel James Y. Adams, USA.

The exercise took place during the period 3-7 December 1962 at the Pentagon in JWGCG facilities.

[REDACTED]

PROLOGUE

GAME STAFF COMMENTS

OLYMPIAD 1-62 was an experiment in both format and participation. In place of the normal "Washington" politico-military model, in which one crisis is examined for a period of about five days, Olympiad attempted to encompass three different current crises plus an excursion into three crises in the next decade. In addition to the model changes, the players came from various non-governmental walks of American life; the Olympians brought a decidedly different viewpoint to the policy planning sessions, and a zest for the fray that was both refreshing and difficult for the game staff to harness.

Certain aspects of Olympiad deserve highlighting:

First - The Blue team stated early Monday morning that they wanted to institute a new type of US foreign policy by acting, rather than reacting. Nevertheless, as play developed, the over-all strategies and policies produced by Blue were not actions, but reactions. This, because they apparently really hold the same viewpoint as the "Governmentians" toward a "second strike" policy.

Second - Both Red and Blue teams in Olympiad were far more willing to take a positive position than the Washington players who have participated in similar games in the past; e.g., in the Iran game, Blue did not quibble over supporting the Shah vs Riah (coup government); Red promptly invaded Iran. Universally, the Blue players decided on moralistic and legalistic grounds rather than international political expediency. The Red team seemed to be guided by national interests more often than Blue as a basis for courses of action.

Third - Blue basic strategies were somewhat similar to those of previous Department players in the Berlin game - BERLIN III (except for the economic blockade in the Norwegian seas), but this was not so in the Iranian crisis (MU III), or the Zonal Inspection game (ZIP IV). Where strategies were similar, even in Berlin, Blue did not seem to be as mollifying, and executed more rapier-like strategies. (Although this may have been due to the press of time - the one-game-per-day pressure.)

100

Fourth - Within teams, divergent viewpoints were vehemently supported and attacked. Whereas Department players will propose different views, they quickly subside to an agreed united front. The Olympians individually battled out their convictions from the opening session to the final critique. This occurred both for "soft" and "hard" approaches to problems. The general consensus, however, was that this nation will not tolerate further erosion of our position in Berlin through "nibbling" negotiations even though it means full-scale nuclear war.

Fifth - Olympiad players were strongly influenced by the recent Cuban actions. Blue felt a strong sense of power, Red of insecurity, at least for the Berlin game. As a result, Blue reacted with available forces rapidly, Red paused to negotiate.

Sixth - Red chose to be "honest" in the disarmament game. Blue refused to believe or accept this, and misunderstanding of intentions remained.

Seventh - In the DAFT sequence, it appeared that all Olympiad players felt the preservation of the gains of civilization to date (such as libraries and "systems" -- medical, social, food distribution, economic, etc.) was of greater value than human life, even in great quantity. A strong plea was entered for a dynamic, expanding, common citizenship federation initially of the English-speaking peoples; an absorption into a common background, rather than alliance of preserved cultural differences, or a contending forum of UN membership.

Noteworthy game-by-game observations:

BERLIN - BLUE:

(1) Regarded situation as major global significance and not just a geographical crisis.

(2) Blue readily took bold steps to show their intentions of maintaining access to Berlin:

(a) Awaken Soviet Ambassador (3:00 A.M.) and deliver diplomatic note stating, "ALL forces necessary to maintain access will be used as the situation dictates."

(b) Immediate reinforcement of Air Forces in Europe.



1a

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(c) Declaration of STATE OF EMERGENCY; US, UK, and France.

(d) Assure Allies that if Red uses force, we will meet it with superior forces.

(e) Reinforce West Berlin and West German forces.

(f) Alert SAC.

(3) Would have used armed force and allowed to escalate to nuclear war if access not granted; willing to accept casualties to gain access.

(4) An innovation was Blue's offer to split each day four ways (6 hours each, US, UK, France and USSR) for access on the autobahn.

(5) Another innovation was a world-wide announcement that the US was ready to send a vast Peace Corps group to East Berlin to assist in raising the standard of living.

(6) The Blue team was also willing to announce to all countries of the world that US assistance would be given immediately to any communist-dominated country which acted to free itself.

(7) Blue felt Red would have withdrawn rather than jeopardize their "peaceful" methods of expansion so successfully employed in the past 15 years.

(8) The "softest" agreed opinion expressed by this team was their willingness to negotiate so long as access remained open. They were firm, however, in their decision that there was nothing to negotiate so long as access was threatened or cut off.

BERLIN - RED:

(1) Red could not conceive of a shooting war over autobahn blockage.

(2) Red would have shot back if West initiated shooting, but would not have resorted to nuc's.

(3) They believed US would not really start a conflict over access.

12

(4) They did feel that if time had been available for additional game cycles that, if Blue applied further pressure, they (Reds) would have backed down and cleared the traffic jam. (Accompanied of course with usual propaganda hue and cry.)

IRAN - BLUE:

(1) In this exercise, as in the Berlin game, one of the first things Blue did was to take action which would indicate realistic determination to succeed in its actions in Iran, even if it meant full-scale nuclear war. This they felt was accomplished by placing SAC on alert.

(2) They also immediately shifted tactical forces (by air) out of Europe into Turkey. These were backed up by reinforcements to Europe out of the United States, and the moving of naval elements into the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.

(3) Logistic support was immediately flown out of Europe into Turkey for surface transport over roads between Turkey and Iran. Blue even took actions to replenish these supplies in Europe from the United States.

(4) Even though Blue had intended, through contingency actions, to seize the Suez Canal if USSR invaded Iran, they showed great flexibility (when the USSR forces penetrating Iran were shown to be large) by diverting the forces intended for Suez to an interdiction role against USSR forces invading Iran.

(5) This group showed great versatility by initiating action in another world area far removed from the USSR. (Cuban Invasion). They also used the explosion of a nuclear weapon (in a remote area) as a demonstration of intent (the latter, however, was carried out in a manner too simple to be effective. It caused no visible consternation to the Red Team).

(6) Blue demonstrated complete determination as the game ended by giving the Soviet 12 hours to withdraw troops from Iran. This was accomplished by a personal phone conversation from Kennedy to Khrushchev.

(7) Blue felt that a far lesser Red effort (other than military moves) - subversion, internal pressures - might have gained their (Red) desired goals; Blue was amazed at Red's invasion.